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THE TITLE VII ADMINISTRATOR:
A CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL
FLEXIBILITY*
Joel B. Harrist
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 has spawned a whole
new field of litigation to enforce equal employment opportunities.
Since the Act went into effect in 1965 an increasing number of
cases have been brought based upon its provisions. With a decade
of experience under the Act, it is now clear, if ever there was
doubt, that winning the case is merely the first step. Drafting a
decree that ensures an effective and prompt end to discrimination
is certainly the most important and most difficult portion of a Title
VII case, particularly where the concern is with the industry-wide
problems encompassed by the "pattern and practice" suits brought
by the federal government.2
A simple injunction prohibiting discrimination is insufficient;
defendants are required to take affirmative action to remedy the
effects of their past discriminatory conduct.3 The decree must
therefore specify the steps which defendants are required to take
and provide some mechanism to ensure its effectuation.
This Article focuses attention on one aspect of judicial efforts
to anticipate unforeseen contingencies and provide practical,
workable solutions to the varied problems which can be expected to
arise under a Title VII decree: the appointment of an official,
responsible to the court, to develop plans for implementing the
decree and to supervise its enforcement. When functioning prop-
erly, this official operates as a quasi-administrative agency, and
through regular and systematic contact with the parties and the
industry, provides continuity as well as expertise to assist the court,
* The views expressed here are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.
t Member of the New York Bar. Assistant U.S. Attorney, Civil Division, Southern
District of New York 1970-1974; Chief, Civil Rights Unit 1973-1974. A.B. 1963, Columbia
College; LL.B. 1966, Harvard University; LL.M. 1967, University of London.
I Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1970).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970). Under the 1972 amendments to the Act (Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat. 107, amending 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-6 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)-(e) (1970)), subsequent to March 24, 1974, the
EEOC has exclusive jurisdiction to bring such suits. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (1970).
3 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
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the litigants, and the class of minority workers whom Title VII is
designed to protect.
I
THE POWER OF THE COURTS TO APPOINT ADMINISTRATORS
A court of equity has very broad power to frame its decrees to
the peculiarities and necessities of each particular case.4 Once a
violation of Title VII has been shown, the courts have wide
discretion to fashion appropriate relief, and have broad power to
grant affirmative remedies to correct the subtle and elusive pat-
terns of discrimination. 5
Under this grant of power, courts have ordered labor unions
to speedily admit qualified minority workers as full members,
without their having to meet any membership requirements other
than ability to perform the type of work involved, 6 enjoined the
use of subjective membership requirements including those con-
tained in a union's constitution, ordered separate referral lists for
black and white workers so that referrals will be on an alternating
basis from each list,8 and required referrals to be made on a first-in
first-out basis, that is, first unemployed, first referred.9 Other
unions have been ordered to operate referrals without regard to
union experience.10 Testing and other hurdles to apprenticeship
programs have been eliminated where they were found to be
exclusionary." And, to ensure that the final vestiges of discrimina-
4 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has declared:
There can be little doubt that where a violation of Title VII is found, the
court is vested with broad remedial power to remove the vestiges of past
discrimination and eliminate present and assure the non-existence of future
barriers to the full enjoyment of equal job opportunities by qualified black
workers .... On the basis of this broad equitable power, the courts have allowed
a wide range of remedial relief.... Without such powers, the district court
would be unable to effectuate the desire of Congress to eliminate all forms of
discrimination.
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553 (9th Cir.), cert. dekd, 404 U.S. 984
(1971). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g), 2000e-6(a) (1970). See also Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d
315, 324 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Local 53, Heat Workers v. Vogler,
407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters, 360 F. Supp.
979 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd and remanded, Civil No. 73-2266 (2d Cir., June 24, 1974).
' Local 53, Heat Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
7 Local 53, Heat Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
a Id.; United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 10, 3 EPD 8068 (D.N.J. 1970).
9 United States v. Plumbers Local 73, 314 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
10 United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
11 United States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters, 360 F. Supp. 979, 991-94 (S.D.N.Y.
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tion are eliminated, courts have imposed goals or even quotas upon
defendants, and these have been consistently upheld on appeal.' 2
It is dear, therefore, that the courts have been quite willing to
fully use their broad equitable powers to issue wide-ranging de-
crees designed to eliminate the lingering effects of past discrimina-
tion. Recognizing that many unforeseen situations will arise in the
course of enforcing their injunctions, several courts have ap-
pointed advisory committees or administrators to supervise various
aspects of their operation.13 The basic function of these court-
appointed officials is threefold: (1) to provide information and
assistance to minority workers to enable them to take advantage of
the full benefits of the court order; 14 (2) to deal with the daily
problems which arise under the decree, thereby preventing major
conflicts between the parties;' 5 and (3) to provide the court with
neutral expertise which can be utilized in recommending changes
in employment practices designed to effectuate the purposes of the
decree.' 6
1973), affd and remanded, Civil No. 73-2266 (2d Cir., June 24, 1974); see United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United
States v. Electrical Workers Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943
(1970). In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court held that practices,
procedures, and tests, neutral on their face and even in intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices. Thus,
intelligence tests, high school diplomas, and other criteria in employment (including admis-
sion to apprenticeship programs) and promotion are proscribed if they operate to exclude
minority workers and cannot be shown to be related to job performance. Id. at 430-31.
12 See, e.g., United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
950 (1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 984 (1971); Local 53, Heat Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters, 360 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd and remanded,
Civil No. 73-2266 (2d Cir., June 24,-1974).
13 See United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters, 360 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), affd and remanded, Civil No. 73-2266 (2d Cir., June 24, 1974); United States v. Local
638, Steam Pipefitters, 347 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202, 1249 (W.D. Wash.
1970), affd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971). "To minimize
unnecessary confusion and turmoil and to assure accurate dissemination and understand-
ing" of its decree, the court in United States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045
(N.D. Ala. 1973), established a three member Implementation Committee, consisting of one
representative from the company, one, from the unions and one from the minority work
force. Id. at 1057.
Is According to Judge Frankel of the Southern District of New York, "[t]he basic goal
of expert and knowledgeable management by the Administrator has been achieved in
substantial measure, largely avoiding an intolerable regime of daily and minute supervision
by the court." United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 341 F. Supp. 694, 695 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), affld, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
16 Thus, in the Local 638 case (see note 43 and notes 76-85 and accompanying text
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Although the use of administrative officials to supervise Title
VII decrees is somewhat novel, courts of equity have long relied
upon the appointment of ad hoc personnel to help them reach and
enforce their decisions. 17 The Supreme Court has recognized that
courts have inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate
assistance in the performance of their duties, 18 and, indeed, in
certain cases that it is the better practice for a court to obtain such
assistance.1 9 This power has been used to employ auditors.2 0 In
addition, it has been exercised by federal courts to appoint a
master in a criminal case to examine subpoenaed files and rule on
whether any of the items were privileged; 2 ' an investigator to
examine, in a bankruptcy context, charges of wrongful disposition
of property;22 and a master to supervise pretrial discovery in a civil
case. 2 3 It has also permitted a court to appoint a commissioner to
hear and determine all garnishment and attachment proceedings
infra), the administrator was responsible for preparing an affirmative action program
designed to reach the goals established by the court. United States v. Local 638, Steam
Pipefitters, 6 EPD 8716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Similarly, in the Wood Lathers case (see notes 30-34,
58-75 and accompanying text infra), the administrator was required to play an important
role in the development of rules for the fair operation of the union's hiring hail. United
States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429, 440-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
17 See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts:
Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 452 (1958). For a discussion of the duties of masters and clerks
in the 17th century chancery practice, see I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAW
416-23 (7th ed. 1956).
18 The Supreme Court noted in 1920 that
[clourts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power
to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance
of their duties.... This power includes authority to appoint persons unconnected
with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they
may arise in the progress of a cause. From the commencement of our Government,
it has been exercised by the federal courts, when sitting in equity, by appointing,
either with or without the consent of the parties, special masters, auditors, examin-
ers and commissioners. To take and report testimony; to audit and state accounts;
to make computations; to determine, where the facts are complicated and the
evidence voluminous, what questions are actually in issue; to hear conflicting
evidence and make finding [sic] thereon; these are among the purposes for which
such aids to the judges have been appointed.
Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1920). See also Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512
(1889); In re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 90 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1937); Westchester Fire
Ins. Co. v. Bringle, 86 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1936).
19-Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Tompkins, 176 U.S. 167, 180 (1900) (appointment of
master to hear testimony and make findings concerning costs of operation in railroad rate
making case).
20 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); see Irving Trust Co. v. Trust Co. of New
Jersey, 75 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1935).
21 Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
22 In re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 90 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1937).
23 Motley, Green & Co. v. Detroit Steel & Spring Co., 174 F. 734 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909);
Zunkel v. Litchfield, 21 F. 196 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1884).
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brought against funds or property in the custody of a court-
appointed receiver.24 And recently, in an area related to the
enforcement of Title VII, the Supreme Court approved the ap-
pointment of an expert to assist a district court in preparing a
workable plan for the desegregation of a public school system. 25
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, providing for
the use of special masters, incorporates the various officials who,
under old practice, assisted the court in the hearing and disposal of
litigation. 26 Although references to masters are explicitly stated to
be the exception and not the rule,27 masters have been appointed
under Rule 53 to perform such tasks as ascertaining profits and
damages, determining commissions and amounts due under a
contract, rendering complex accountings, supervising discovery
proceedings, superintending the election of corporate directors,
taking evidence, and determining questions of foreign law. 28 But
despite this broad grant of authority, Rule 53 in no way encompas-
ses all of the assistance to which courts are entitled; the courts
retain their inherent power to appoint necessary officials. 29
24 Harmon v. Best, 174 Ind. 323, 91 N4.E. 19 (1910). The court stated that it "certainly
had the power to make all reasonably necessary orders in the administration of said
receivership." Id. at 335, 91 N.E. at 23; Central Trust Co. v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry., 59
F. 523, 528 (C.C.D. Ky. 1894).
25 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). "In default by
the school authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has
broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system." Id. at 16. See also
order in United States v. Board of School Comm'rs. No. IP 68-C-225 (S.D. Ind., Aug. 20,
1973) (two commissioners appointed by court to draft interim and final plans for de-
segregation of school system) (on file at the CorneU Law Review).
26 "Thus 'master' includes the master in chancery, the referee, the auditor, the ex-
aminer, the commissioner and the assessor." 5A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.03 (2d ed.
1974).
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
28 See 5A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.05[2] (2d ed. 1974).
29 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971). In Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956), the district court's
appointment of a master in a criminal case was specifically approved:
The appointment of a Master could not be claimed to have been an improper act in
the situation.... [The Court may, in its discretion, make appointment of a Master-
to assist in any of the incidents of a proceeding before it, whether civil or criminal,
so long as there is no infringement upon the right of trial by jury or any prejudice
to other substantive right.
232 F.2d at 864-65.
In First Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613 (&t Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957), a special master was appointed to supervise the complex
pre-trial discovery and related proceedings in a private treble-damage antitrust suit, incud-
ing the conducting of a hearing and the determination of plaintiffs' motion to remove their
attorneys of record. The order of the district court conferred on the master those powers
authorized by Rule 53 and further provided
that this entire cause be referred to him for such proceedings as may be necessary,
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
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EMPLOYMENT OF ADMINISTRATORS AND COMMITTEES IN
TITLE VII CASES
The earliest use of an administrator in a Title VII context
occurred in United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, a case which was
originally concluded by a consent decree. 30 The settlement agree-
ment required the defendant union to take various steps to achieve
equal employment opportunity and provided for the appointment
by the court of "an impartial person to implement the provisions of
this Agreement and to supervise its performance." It delineated
the administrator's powers and duties as follows:
The Administrator shall be empowered to take all actions,
including the establishment of record-keeping requirements, as
he deems necessary to implement the provisions of this Agree-
ment, to ensure the performance of this Agreement and to
remedy any breach thereof. The Administrator shall decide any
questions or disputes or complaints arising under this Agree-
ment, including questions of interpretation of the Agreement
and claims of violations of this Agreement acting either on his
own initiative or at the request of any interested person. All
decisions of the Administrator shall be in writing and shall be
final. 31
Judge Frankel, who approved the consent decree, referred to
the provisions dealing with the administrator as "[tihe somewhat
novel and perhaps most interesting part of the agreement."32 He
to hear evidence, to take testimony on any issue herein, to pass on disputed daims,
to pass on applications of the parties and to make where necessary special findings
of fact and conclusions of law thereon and to report the same to the Court.
Id. at 626. Despite this broad delegation of power to the master, the. Eighth Circuit, citingEx
parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920), and Schwimmer, upheld his appointment and exercise of
powers under Rule 53 and the inherent power of courts to supply themselves with essential
instruments for the administration of justice. 245 F.2d at 626-27.
Naturally, assistance to the courts can also be provided by legislation. See, e.g., the
Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1970). A short history of the legislation
establishing the magistrate's predecessor, the U.S. commissioner, and outlining his powers
and duties, is set forth in United States v. Hom Hing, 48 F. 635, 638-40 (N.D.N.Y. 1892). See
also Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). Because these officials are
legislative creations, different problems are raised with respect to the scope of their powers;
hence any further discussion of their functions herein is unnecessary. Cf. Holiday v.
Johnson, 313 U.S. 342, 351-53 (1941).
30 2 EPD 10,226 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The author served as counsel for the United States
in this action but has restricted his remarks to matters of public record.
31 Id. at 879. The agreement also provided that the administrator did not have the
right to amend, modify, or change the substantive terms thereof and that his compensation
(which was to be agreed upon in advance by the administrator and parties) and expenses
would be paid by the defendants. Id.
32 United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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later reflected on the responsibility of the administrator to exercise
detailed supervision and directive authority to achieve the decree's
purposes. In his view, "[t]he Administrator was to have not mere
policing functions, but the broadly creative role, in close contact
with the parties and their work, of evolving 'rules and procedures'
to implement the goal of 'equal employment opportunities.' "33 In
that same opinion, the court indicated that it conceived of the
administrator as a quasi-administrative body by comparing the
recommendations of the administrator following his study of the
industry employment needs to administrative rule-making.3 4
In United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,35 a federal district court
found that the defendants-unions and apprenticeship committees
in the electrical, sheet metal, ironworker, plumbing, pipefitting,
and operating engineer trades-had been guilty of a pattern and
practice of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII, and
issued a decree requiring them to take affirmative steps designed
to remedy the discriminatory effects of their activities. Specific
changes were ordered in the membership application procedures,
the hiring hall system and the apprenticeship training programs.
To translate the legal framework into practical results for the
affected minority workers, Chief Judge Lindberg of the Western
District of Washington established an "Advisory Committee" of
nine members-two from labor, two from the contractors, two
from the black and one from another minority community, and
two from state and local governments. Funded by the defendants,
the Advisory Committee was given responsibility for conciliation,
consultation, and cooperation with the parties, and for communica-
tion with the minority community. 36 Subsequently, the difficulties
experienced in achieving the goals and enforcing the programs set
When one iacet of the case came before it for review, the Second Circuit commented
favorably on this "innovative decree." 471 F.2d at 416.
33 United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 341 F. Supp. 694, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd,
471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
34 "The relevant analogy is, of course, to administrative rule-making rather than
adjudication, and it is familiar learning by now that administrators need not go through the
forms of a trial in fashioning rules." Itd at 697.
" 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 984 (1971).
36 It was also empowered to do the following:
(iii) When the special apprenticeship programs are finally drawn up by the appren-
ticeship committees, the Advisory Committee shall submit a report to the Court
expressing its views thereon;
(iv) The committee shall issue the letters of recommendation ... to persons who are
likely to successfully complete the special apprenticeship training programs. The
committee shall also have the power to designate other persons or organizations for
the purpose of issuing such letters.
Id. at 1249.
1974]
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forth in the decree led the court to increase the powers of the
Advisory Committee, first by granting it the responsibility and
authority to make recommendations directly to the court and to
petition the court to issue such orders as might be necessary to
implement and effectuate the purposes of the decree,3 7 and then
more drastically so that it could require the acceptance of a
sufficient number of applicants to meet the goals set forth in the
court's order. 8
As part of its comprehensive injunction, the district court in
United States v. United States Steel Corp.,39 followed the Ironworkers
model and created an "Implementation Committee" to ensure the
dissemination of information and explanations concerning the
rights and procedures provided for in its decree and to try to
resolve problems relating to its effectuation without resorting to
the court. In addition, the Committee was empowered to receive
s United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 5 EPD 7972 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
The Advisory Committee's powers were increased as follows:
1. The Court Order Advisory Committee (COAC) ... shall cause all employees [sic]
• . . to employ the maximum number of apprentices required ....
3. All parties to this action shall file with the Court and the COAC the name and
address of any employer known to them who fails upon COAC direction to employ
a special apprentice and shall cause a copy of such filing and a copy of this order to
be mailed by certified mail to such employer.
4. Ten days after the employer has received or rejected such notice, the COAC
shall conduct a hearing upon reasonable notice to such employer, following which
hearing the COAC shall submit a report and recommendation to the United States
and the Court stating (a) that the matter has been satisfactorily resolved or (b) that a
hearing be held before the Court and penalties be fixed among the following:
(1) [sic] Fines not to exceed $1,000.00 per day;
(ii) An order to comply under sanction of contempt proceedings;
(iii) Such other and further remedy as the Court may deem just and proper....
5. In order to meet the goals of this Court's orders of June 16, 1970, the COAC
shall exercise fully its powers under this and prior orders in this case to require the
acceptance of a sufficient number of special apprentice applicants to bring the total
number of actively participating special apprentices up to at least [certain specified]
• . . levels by July 7, 1972 ....
6. On or before August 15, 1972, the COAC shall make specific recommendations
to the Court concerning timetables and numbers for fulfilling the minimum goals
for the third year's implementation of the Court's orders; and such recommenda-
tions shall advise the Court whether the goals can be met by September 15, 1972.
Id. at 6593.
39 5 EPD 8619 (N.D. Ala. 1973). In its subsequently published findings of fact, the
court pointed out that the Implementation Committee was designed to "minimize unneces-
sary confusion and turmoil and to assure accurate dissemination and understanding" of its
decree. Furthermore,
[i]n addition to acting as a communications link, the Implementation Committee is
available to monitor the grievance procedures for possible deviation from the
principles established by the court decree and has assisted in the preparation of
plans for upgrading to journeyman status certain black employees in conformity
with the court's decree.
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045, 1057 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
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copies of all grievance complaints relating to the operation of the
decree, or to actions taken under it, to review them and to take
appropriate action. It is still too early to ascertain whether this
decree is working or whether the court, as in the Ironworkers case,
will find it necessary to increase the Committee's powers.
In United States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters,4 ° Judge Gurfein
found that the defendant union, Local 40, International Associa-
tion of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, had en-
gaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination. In order to
ensure fairness in the union's journeyman admissions procedures
in the future, the decree provided for an impartial examining
board, consisting of three persons-one from the faculty of the
Engineering School of Columbia University, one from the faculty
of Stevens Institute, and one from an aptitude testing service-to
validate and administer a job-related test to applicants for union
membership. The board was not given any other responsibilities.41
The court also considered appointing an ombudsman for minority
workers to oversee the operation of the union's hiring hall, but
finally rejected the idea on practical grounds, namely, that deter-
mining which worker should get a particular job requires an
element of judgment, and "one can prophesy endless disputes in a
matter so incapable of resolution by objective standards. '42
More recently, in a related action under the same caption,
United States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters,4 s Judge Bonsal appointed
40 347 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) [hereinafter referred to in text as the Local 40
case]. The original complaint was made by the United States Attorney General on July 29,
1971 against Local 40 of the Bridgeworkers, Local 638 of the Steam Pipefitters, and two
other building trades union locals. The district court ordered separate trials for each
defendant. The case cited here is the separate action brought against Local 40, Bridge-
workers, although the report retains the caption, "United States v. Local 638, Steam
Pipefitters." See 347 F. Supp. at 171.
41 See also United States v. Electrical Workers Local 130, 2 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAC.
GUIDE 5106 (E.D. La. 1972). In this case, a consent decree was entered, which, in addition
to providing certain affirmative relief, established an advisory committee to assist in the
recruitment of blacks, the advanced placement of blacks in the apprenticeship program, and
tomake recommendations concerning the operation of the special apprenticeship program
for training minority workers.
42 347 F. Supp. at 183. Unfortunately, the court's decision to leave this matter in the
hands of union officials has meant that the complaints which continue to be received from
minority workers concerning discriminatory work referrals cannot be resolved in a speedy
and impartial fashion. See note 53 and accompanying text infra.
43 360 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd and remanded, Civil No. 73-2266 (2d Cir.,June
24, 1974) [hereinafter referred to in text as the Local 638 case]. The case cited here is the
separate action against Local 638, Enterprise Association of Steam Pipefitters. See note 40
supra. The injunctive decree is reported at 6 EPD 8716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
The author also served as counsel for the United States in this action, but has restricted
his comments to matters of public record.
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an administrator and gave him powers similar to those possessed
by the administrator in Wood Lathers.44 In addition, the Local 638
administrator was charged with the duty to work out and submit to
the court an affirmative action program to meet the minimum goal
of thirty percent minority journeyman union membership by July
1, 1977, as well as to supervise the testing, publicity, and other
procedures established by the court. The administrator was also
required to conduct an investigation of the work referral system to
determine whether it effectuated equal employment opportunities
and, if not, to recommend changes in the system.4
III
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE ADMINISTRATOR:
DOES THE EXPERIMENT WORK?
The appointment of administrators in Title VII cases raises
the following two questions: (1) whether as a practical matter the
appointment of an administrator has facilitated the supervision
and enforcement of Title VII decrees, and (2) what powers can
and should be delegated to a court-appointed administrator and
what form should the administration take.
A. Administrators in Action
It is significant that most of the cases where an administrator
or committee has been appointed involve the construction indus-
44 See notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra. Since Judge Bonsai sits in the same
district as Judge Frankel, it is hardly surprising that he used the Wood Lathers decree as a
model in framing the portion of the Local 638 decree appointing an administrator.
Judge Bonsai, in appointing an "Administrator to implement the provisions of [thel
decree and supervise its performance" (6 EPD at 5172-73), outlined the powers of the
administrator as follows:
In addition to the powers specified in this decree, the Administrator shall be
empowered to take all actions, including the establishment of such additional
record-keeping requirements as he deems necessary to implement the provisions
and ensure the performance of this decree. The Administrator shall hear and
determine all complaints concerning the operation of this decree and shall decide
any questions of interpretation and claims of violations of this decree, acting either
on his own initiative or at the request of any interested person or party. All
decisions of the Administrator shall be in writing and shall be appealable to the
Court.
Id. at 5173.
The decree also provides, as in the Wood Lathers case, that the administrator does not
have the right to amend, modify, or change the substantive terms of the decree, and further
states that he shall remain in office for an initial period of three years and thereafter for
such time as the court shall determine. Id
45 Id. at 5173-76. No appeal was taken with respect to the appointment of the
administrator or the definition of his powers. United States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters,
Civil No. 73-2266, at-4375 (2d Cir., June 24, 1974). Nevertheless, Judge Hays, in his'dissent,
commented favorably on the appointment of an administrator "to effectuate the various
remedial alternatives in an affirmative action program." Id. at 4397 (dissenting opinion).
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try, which is characterized by its decentralized nature and the
mobility of its workers. Employers are small, work crews shift from
job to job, and powerful unions control the supply of workers,
often through the use of exclusive hiring halls. 4 6 Employment is
unstable, and despite its size the entire industry lacks cohesion and
integration.47 Under these circumstances, elimination of racial bar-
riers is most difficult, and effective supervision of court decrees
could easily impose intolerable burdens on the federal courts.
Employment of an administrator in these cases seems particularly
appropriate. 48
The court-appointed administrators function as quasi-
administrative agencies.49 Not only can they troubleshoot, they can
investigate, criticize and recommend in the manner of an
ombudsman,50 and they can create practical solutions to un-
foreseen problems arising under a decree. Combining the much-
needed qualities of flexibility and continuity, the administrator
adds a new dimension to injunctive decrees-a continuous super-
visory role, far greater than even the most vigorous judge could
ever hope to achieve, with a vast capability for examination, revi-
sion, innovation and creativity. 51 The vast potentialities of this
device are only limited by the scope of the decree, the character
and ability of the administrator, the willingness of the parties to
cooperate with him, and the court's review of his actions.
B. The Local 40 Case
The Local 40 case discussed above 52 furnishes a good example
of the contrast between a broad injunction which effusively recites
the goal of equal employment opportunities and the actual realiza-
tion of an integrated industry. It thus highlights the desirability of
46 Chayes, Kaufman & Wheeler, The University's Role in Promoting Minority Group
Employment in the Construction Industry, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 94-97 (1970).
4 W. HABER & H. LEVINSON, LABOR RELATIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE BUILDING
TRADES 9 (1956).
48 See Yeager, Litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, The Construction
Industry and the Problem of the "Unqualified" Minority Worker, 59 GEo. L.J. 1265 (1971).
'9 See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
50 For a general discussion of the history and present status of the ombudsman
throughout the world, see Orfield, The Scandinavian Ombudsman, 19 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1966).
The New Zealand Ombudsman, for example, has power to investigate complaints and
render opinions. Id. at 49.
51 This has particular value in Title V11 cases where the court usually retains jurisdic-
tion for a number of years. See, e.g., United States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefittirs, Civil No.
73-2266 (2d Cir.,June 24, 1974); United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
52 United States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters, 347 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See
notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
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an administrator. Two years after entry of the decree, only a
handful of minority workers have been admitted to the union, and
complaints abound in the minority community that the union's
hiring hall continues to be run in a discriminatory fashion.53 The
court's decree has been unsuccessful and examination of it shows
why: It failed to require sufficient specific affirmative action by the
union to remedy the effects of past discrimination and it failed to
provide adequate means for its enforcement.54
Although the major difficulties are attributable to the limited
relief ordered by the court, the presence of an administrator-or
an ombudsman, as the court itself had considered appointing 55-at
least would have prevented further abuses in the hiring hall and
would have provided the court with neutral expert assistance in
revising its injunction to achieve more meaningful results.
On the other hand, in the Wood Lathers56 and Local 63857 cases
there is a single administrator supervising each decree and the
results have been strikingly better than those achieved in the Local
40 case. To a great extent, more comprehensive affirmative relief
contained in the court orders has been responsible for their suc-
cess, but the presence of an administrator has certainly been an
important factor. Examination of the administrator's role in each
case illustrates his usefulness.
C. The Wood Lathers Case
In the Wood Lathers case, the court appointed George Mos-
kowitz, a seasoned labor attorney and arbitrator, to serve as ad-
ministrator under the consent decree.58 Mr. Moskowitz assumed
his position immediately, and has served as administrator ever
since. During his four and one-half years in office, Mr. Moskowitz
has tackled all of the problems which have arisen. He has arbi-
trated, ordered, cajoled, discussed, mediated and recommended.
Although the agreement and consent decree gave the adminis-
trator wide-ranging power,59 Mr. Moskowitz, perhaps conscious of
53 This information was conveyed to the author by V. Pamela Davis, the Assistant
United States Attorney who is representing the federal government in the Local 40 case.
54 As already pointed out, the examining board had only limited responsibilities. See
notes -40-42 and accompanying text supra.
55 See text accompanying note 42 supra.
56 2 EPD 10,226 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
57 6 EPD 8716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
58 328 F. Supp. at 434.
51 See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra. Such powers can be delegated to a
master with the consent of all parties. Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (1889); United States
v. Rathbone, 27 F. Gas. 711 (No. 16,121) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828). However, there are some
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his unique role, proceeded very cautiously at first, and the union
continued its discriminatory conduct. Thus, although the consent
decree required Wood Lathers Local 46 to prepare, within six
months, a set of proposed "objective rules and procedures to
implement" the "[e]qual employment opportunities" provided for
therein, the administrator took no action when the union, after
waiting until the very last minute, produced only a "trivial and
superficial" product. The government reacted to the union's ef-
forts with a show of despair and disgust, and proceeded to file a
motion for contempt of court.60 After a long hearing, at which the
only thing the parties agreed upon was the desirability of retaining
the administrator, the district court concluded that the union's
conduct had frustrated all attempts by the administrator to pro-
mote equal employment opportunities 61 and found the union to be
in contempt.62
After the contempt decision, the administrator hastened his
pace. First, he undertook a revision of the union's hiring hall rules
at the behest of Judge Frankel,63 whose contempt decision was
largely based on the union's discriminatory referral practices. This
revision imposed a detailed regimen upon the union which became
effective on August 17, 1971, and which has required the adminis-
trator to be available on a regular basis to supervise its
performance.64 To assist him in this effort, the administrator hired
a computer company, built computer capability into the hiring hall
rules, and now receives periodic computer print-outs (paid for by
the union) enabling him to rapidly determine whether Wood
limits even where all parties consent. Thus, a wholesale delegation of judicial power to a
master may well be rejected. Cademartori v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 18 F.R.D. 277, 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
60 United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). As
Judge Frankel noted: "It is also possible to speculate with hindsight that the Administrator,
seeking to promote harmony and a spirit of voluntary cooperation, may have been more
patient than any of the parties had a right to expect." Id.
61 The Administrator has tried, with some considerable success, to guide the
parties, through a combination of gentle force and patient persuasion, toward
effective management of the obligations detailed in their agreement. Unfortu-
nately, however, defendant Local has displayed only measured enthusiasm for the
basic objective of nondiscriminatory employment, and its key officers have both
permitted and participated in the violations ....
Id. at 434.
62 Id. at 438.
63 Id. at 440-41.
64 The order promulgating the hiring hall rules is not reported, but is referred to by
Judge Frankel in a subsequent opinion. See United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 341 F.
Supp. 694, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939
(1973).
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Lathers Local 46 is complying with the hiring hall rules, and to
check on the validity of individual complaints.65
Following promulgation of the hiring hall rules, Mr. Mos-
kowitz turned his attention to a study of the industry's future
employment opportunities, a task he was specifically required to
perform under the consent decree. 66 The administrator wrote a
detailed study, analyzing attrition rates and work opportunities,
and then estimated job openings in the industry for the succeeding
five years. 67 Based upon this data, he recommended that the union
open its hiring hall by issuing work permits enabling new workers
to be brought into the industry.68 Through the use of a one-to-one
ratio of minority permits to white permits, combined with a fixed
yearly minimum of new permits to be issued, his recommendations
were designed to achieve approximately twenty-five percent minor-
ity participation in the industry by the end of 1975. These recom-
mendations were adopted by Judge Frankel and affirmed by the
Second Circuit.69 Thereafter, the administrator supervised the
issuance of these work permits, 70 ensuring both the union's com-
pliance with the order and the absence of any racial confrontation.
In addition, the administrator, whose name, address, and
telephone number are posted in the hiring hall, receives a nearly
continuous flow of complaints. Resolution of these complaints is
'5 Letter from Mr. Moskowitz to author, May 14, 1973 (on file at the Cornell Law
Review); letter from Mr. Moskowitz to Louis Schwartz, Aug. 20, 1973 (on file at the Cornel
Law Review).
s The decree outlined this responsibility as follows:
The Administrator shall as soon as practicable make an objective study of the
issues relating to the issuance of work permits based upon the needs of the industry
and taking into account the purpose of achieving equal employment opportunity,
which study may include such factors as the total number of work permits to be
issued, the number of permits to be issued from time to time, and the manner of
issuance, and based upon such study shall recommend such changes, if any, as he
deems advisable in the system for the issuance of permits.
United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 2 EPD 10,226, at 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
'7 Mr. Moskowitz was assisted in this task by a graduate student in economics at
Columbia University.
" The union had dosed its permit window in 1970 shortly after the effective date of
the consent decree, and for the first time stopped issuing permits to use its hiring hall.
(Without a permit, nonunion workers cannot seek employment in the territorial jurisdiction
of Local 46). The net result of the union's action, when coupled with its discriminatory
behavior towards the few minority workers who held work permits, was to continue the
exclusion of minority workers from the industry. United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46,
471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
619 United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 341 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 471
F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
70 On one almost calamitous occasion, hundreds of men slept for days on 76th Street in
New York City awaiting the issuance of the permits. N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1973, at 47, col. 2;
N.Y. Times, April 27, 1973, at 39, col. 3.
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itself almost a full-time job, and includes everything from simply
explaining the rules to conducting evidentiary hearings.
Through these efforts, which of course have involved count-
less hours of work, the Wood Lathers administrator has kept en-
forcement efforts on the right track, has handled many grievances
which, if left unresolved could have blown up into major racial
disturbances, and has kept the court largely free to pursue its other
business. Proceeding informally, for the most part over the tele-
phone, by mail, and at meetings with one or more of the parties,
the administrator has helped to formulate practical solutions to
unforeseen problems not covered by the decree.7 ' He has made
exceptions where decretal provisions would have resulted in an
unduly harsh or unjust result,7 2 and has recommended significant
modifications where necessary to effectuate equal employment
opportunities.7 3
Overall the administrator's techniques have worked effectively.
One phone call is often enough to correct a violation or to get a
complaining minority worker a job. Instead of being allowed to
intensify, problems are dealt with immediately and impartially, and
potential crises are quickly defused.7 4 Gradually the union mem-
bers have grown accustomed to working with minority groups and
the volume of complaints of discrimination seems to have tapered
off.7 5 Meanwhile, the court, and often the attorneys for the liti-
71 For example, the hiring hail rules require that all persons seeking work in New York
City appear in person at the hiring hail for referral. When the gasoline crisis made it
difficult for many to get to the hail, the administrator considered a temporary modification
of the rules for workers who lived in outlying districts and sought work near their homes.
See, e.g., letter from Mr. Moskowitz to Thomas Reynolds, President of Local 46, Feb. 22,
1974 (on file at the Cornel Law Review).
72 For instance, from time to time returning veterans (white) have applied to renew
their old work permits to use the Local 46 hiring hail. The administrator has allowed
renewals where the applicant had a valid permit at the time he entered military service and
reapplied for such permit promptly after discharge. All other requests for renewal have
been denied. See, e.g., letters from Mr. Moskowitz to Thomas Reynolds, President of Local
46, Feb. 22, 1974, Sept. 17, 1973, Dec. 13, 1972, and June 22, 1972 (on file at the Cornell Law
Rw).
73 For discussion concerning issuance of new work permits, see notes 68-70 and
accompanying text supra.
74 There have been times, however, when Mr. Moskowitz, who is a busy private
practitioner, has not been immediately available to respond to a complaint. On one occasion,
a sudden illness prevented the administrator from rendering a prompt decision. Naturally
these situations were annoying to the parties and delayed matters somewhat, but they have
had little impact on the case as a whole. Indeed, most of the complaints handled by the
administrator were too insignificant to justify court proceedings; without his presence they
would probably have gone totally unresolved.
75 While there were no statistics prepared by the administrator concerning the volume
of complaints, he has informed the parties orally that the number of complaints has
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gants, have been spared many headaches, and problems have been
solved much more swiftly and practically than if they had been
required to await formal juridical proceedings.7 6
D. The Local 638 Case
In his decision in Local 638, 7 Judge Bonsal appointed Vincent
McDonnell, Chairman of the New York State Board of
Mediation, 78 to serve as administrator. Mr. McDonnell was given a
number of immediate tasks in addition to his general duties: he
was required to work with the parties to develop an affirmative
action program, to supervise the testing of minority applicants for
journeyman membership in the union, to formulate a new appren-
ticeship class of 400 members, and to study the industry referral
system.79
Facing immediate deadlines without having been exposed to
the extensive background of the case, the administrator nonethe-
less performed decisively and effectively. In the first six months,
864 minority workers were scheduled to take the journeyman
admission test, 488 minority workers were admitted to union
membership, 175 minority apprentices were indentured, and an
affirmative action proposal was adopted, all without the parties
finding it necessary to return to the district court for guidance. s
Indeed, by the end of the seventh month the union had achieved a
minority membership of 888,81 a staggering figure in light of its
past exclusionary practices.82
diminished. This of course does not mean that all complaints have ceased. See, e.g., letter
from author to Mr. Moskowitz, Apr. 30, 1974 (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
76 When the Second Circuit reviewed the union's challenge to the order requiring it to
issue work permits, it specifically reviewed the procedures followed by Mr. Moskowitz in the
preparation of his study of the industry and concluded that, under the terms of the consent
decree, no formal evidence-gathering process was required and that the union had not been
denied due process. As the court pointed out, due process permits flexibility. Thus, there
can he no douht that the administrator's informal procedures are satisfactory for most
determinations. United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 415-16 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
" United States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters, 6 EPD 1 8716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
18 Mr. Moskowitz has also held that position.
79 6 EPD 8716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
8' Letter from union to Mr. McDonnell, Dec. 19, 1973 (on file at the Cornell Law
Review); see also Transcript of Conference before Judge Bonsai, Jan. 21, 1974, at 1-4 (on file
at the Cornell Law Review).$1 See Transcript of Conference before Judge Bonsai, supra note 80, at 3.
"2 The first minority workers were admitted to Local 638, Steam Pipefitters, in 1967. In
1971, when the government filed its lawsuit, there were only 31 black and Spanish surnamed
members of the 3,850-man union. Union States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters, 360 F. Supp.
979, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd and remanded, Civil No. 73-2266 (2d Cir., June 24, 1974). By
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Like Mr. Moskowitz, Mr. McDonnell has also successfully op-
erated informally and disposed of complaints and other problems
which, if left unresolved, could have developed into serious racial
disputes.8 3 Although there have been occasions when Mr. McDon-
nell was unavailable, causing a certain amount of delay, there can
be no doubt that he too has met what Judge Frankel called the
"basic goal of expert and knowledgeable management ... avoiding
an intolerable regime of daily and minute supervision by the
court."
8 4
Thus, the experience to date indicates that judicially appointed
administrators can perform a very useful role in supervising and
enforcing civil rights decrees. Both Wood Lathers and Local 638 are
landmark cases, not only because of the appointment of adminis-
trators but also in view of the marked achievements under the
respective decrees. Wood Lathers Local 46, which allowed only a
handful of minority workers to use its hiring hall prior to 1970, has
issued new work permits to over 330 minority workers, with
another 125 scheduled to be issued in 1974, bringing minority
participation in the work force to approximately fifteen percent, 5
and its hiring hall is finally being run on a non-discriminatory
basis, ensuring greater equality in work opportunities. Similarly,
minority participation in Local 638, Steam Pipefitters, has grown
by close to 700 since the decree was entered, and great strides are
being taken to reach thirty percent minority membership by July 1,
January 1974, minority group membership in the union had increased to 880. See Tran-
script of Conference before Judge Bonsai, supra note 80, at 3. This is out of a total
membership of approximately 5085. (This figure is computed as follows: In his opinion,
Judge Bonsai determined that, as of 1972, there were 4198 union members, of whom 191
were minority workers. 360 F. Supp. at 984. Since then, 188 whites and 689 minority
workers (880-191) have joined the union (id. at 989), thus, there were approximately 5085
union members in January 1974).
83 This point deserves repeated emphasis. These are not simply paper litigations; the
parties feel quite deeply about these matters, and often the situation can get quite tense. For
example, during the pendency of a preliminary injunction motion designed to obtain union
membership for certain specific minority workers, Local 638 members staged a walkout
inspired by the lay-off of an equal number of whites and minority workers, and many
minority workers felt physically threatened. The walkout was temporarily enjoined by the
Court (United States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters, Civil No. 71-2877 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 10,
1971)), and thereafter the men returned to work.
" United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 341 F. Supp. 694, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd,
471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
In addition to his own ability as an administrator, Mr. McDonnell's success may be
attributed in part to what he has learned from occasional consultation with Mr. Moskowitz,
the Local 46 administrator (see notes 58-76 and accompanying text supra), the specificity of
the decree, and the cooperation of the parties.
" See affidavit of Walter M. Colleran, Esq., in support of union's application to the
administrator, May 3, 1974 (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
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1977.86 The remarkable results achieved in these two cases are in
no small part due to the performance of the respective adminis-
trators.
E. The Power of the Administrator and the Form
of Administration
In light of these precedents, two important questions
arise: (1) what authority can and should a court delegate to the
Title VII administrator, and what powers of review must the court
exercise; and (2) what form should the administration take?
1. Delegated Powers and Judicial Review
There are definite limits to the scope of authority that a court
can permissibly delegate to an administrator.87 Without the consent
of all parties, the court must reserve to itself the duty and the right
to review the evidence and the administrator's findings and
conclusions.88 And even with consent, it is doubtful that a court
could wholly delegate its responsibilities to an administrator.8 9
Thus, Rule 53(e)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that the parties can stipulate that the master's findings of fact
be final, but matters of law must be left for the court's
determination. 90 It is clear, therefore, that no matter how broadly
defined the administrator's powers may be there will be judicial
review of his decisions.91
The standard of review is less clear. Rule 53(e)(2) states that
"[iln an action to be tried without a jury the court shall accept the
s See note 82 supra. By order dated March 29, 1974, Judge Bonsai adopted an
affirmative action plan which, inter alia, required the union to admit sufficient numbers of
minority journeymen and apprentices to reach the following minimum goals: 15% by July
15, 1974; 20% by July 15, 1975; 25% by July 15, 1976; and 30% by July 1, 1977. The plan
also sets forth a program designed to ensure that these goals are met. United States v. Local
638, Steam Pipefitters, Civil No. 71-2877 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 29, 1974).
87 See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); NLRB v. Remington Rand,
Inc., 130 F.2d 919, 937-38 (2d Cir. 1942) (Clark, J., concurring).
I8 Holt Mfg. Co. v. C. L- Best Gas Traction Co., 245 F. 354 (N.D. Cal. 1917). The
federal master is akin to a referee to hear and report, not a referee to hear and determine. See
J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 4001.04, 4001.06,
4201.08 (1973).
"I Cademartori v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 18 F.R.D. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). A decree
which gives an administrator sweeping powers to issue orders and to back them up through
the use of fines and penalties is of doubtful validity. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352
U.S. 249 (1957); NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1942).
90 5A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.15 (2d ed. 1974).
91 In Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
833 (1956), the court stated that the master's actions could only have legal validity "through
some form of subsequent confirmation or approval on the part of the Court."
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master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. ' 92 In a jury trial,
the findings of the master are entitled to prima facie weight. 93
Prior to the adoption of Rule 53, some courts treated a master's
findings as presumptively correct. 94 Since the Title VII adminis-
trator is appointed pursuant to the court's inherent.powers, 95 and
not under Rule 53, it is unclear whether the "clearly erroneous,"
"prima facie," or "presumptively correct" standard of review
should be applied. And the cases decided to date offer little
guidance on this point.
In the Wood Lathers case, there have been two occasions when
decisions by the administrator have been reviewed by the district
court. The first was when the administrator proposed new hiring
hall rules; the second was when he recommended the issuance of
new work permits. In each instance the party who concurred in the
administrator's decision successfully moved in district court for an
order making the recommendations effective. 96 Once, the court
stated, without citing authority, that the administrator's judgments
should be given prima fade weight. 97 There was no discussion of
judicial review on the second occasion.
No further light is shed upon this problem by the Ironworkers
case where the revised order provides that the advisory committee
shall make recommendations which the parties can then litigate
before the court.98 Although the decree uses the terms "report and
recommendations," no standard of review is specified. Similarly,
the Local 638 decree provides only that all decisions of the adminis-
trator shall be in writing "and shall be appealable to the Court."99
Again, no standard of review has been provided and there are no
decisions under the decree to provide guidance. At present, there-
fore, the amount of authority which can be delegated to an
92 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
93 5A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.14[4] (2d ed. 1974); see Ex parte Peterson, 253
U.S. 300 (1920); In re Joslyn's Estate, 171 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1948).
" Ferguson Contracting Co. v. Manhattan Trust Co., 118 F. 791 (6th Cir. 1902); see
Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 666-67 (1888). Equity Rule 612 set forth this standard of
review, although it also provided that the court could modify or reject a master's report
when it was "fully satisfied that error has been committed." Amendments of Equity Rules,
286 U.S. 571 (1932). Professor Moore demonstrates that more weight is given to a master's
report under Rule 53's "dearly erroneous" standard than under the old practice. 5A J.
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.12[1] (2d ed. 1974).
" Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
" See notes 62-69 and accompanying text supra.
9' United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, Civil No. 68-2116 (S.D.N.Y., May 12, 1971).
91 United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 5 EPD 7972 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
9 United States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters, 6 EPD 8716, at 5173 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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administrator is not entirely clear, although it is apparent that the
court must review the administrator's findings, and that those
findings are entitled to great weight.
Nevertheless, so long as some form of judicial review is re-
tained by the district court, the impressive results obtained in the
Wood Lathers and Local 638 cases demonstrate that a wide scope of
authority should be given to the administrator to ensure that he is
equipped to deal with all unforeseen contingencies which might
develop under the decree. Since flexibility combined with power is
the ideal, broad general language may well be sufficient to accom-
plish the desired ends.100 Another approach is to be far more
specific in detailing the administrator's powers, with a catch-al
clause at the end of the decree to provide for unforeseen
contingencies. 1 1 It would appear to be sound practice to further
define the scope of the administrator's powers and duties. This
would, it is submitted, increase the power which the administrator
can exercise, for it would both encourage him to act and provide
him with specific language to point to if challenged. And to some
extent at least, it would reduce the likelihood that he would see
himself as just an arbitrator with a panoply of vague, unusable
powers; instead, his character as a quasi-administrative agency,
with specific duties to perform and specific powers to perform
them with, would be clearly revealed.
It is also extremely important for the court to promulgate
comprehensive and specific affirmative relief, especially in the early
stages when the administrator is "getting his feet wet." Indeed,
short run goals are more readily met through specific decretal
language, leaving the creative role of an administrator to bear fruit
in the longer-range aspects of the case. Moreover, a detailed
injunction provides the administrator with a focus for the exercise
of his powers and enables him to move forward swiftly to the
mechanics of achieving equal employment opportunities.'0 2
To some extent, of course, a specific decree limits the powers
of the administrator. Although specificity can be useful in forcing a
100 See, e.g., United States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters, 6 EPD 8716 (S.D.N.Y 1973).
"' For example, in the Wood Lathers case, after the contempt hearing, the government
prolosed that the decree be revised to provide the administrator with specific guidelines for
action. This suggestion, however, was rejected by the court. 328 F. Supp. at 440.
102 In the Local 638 case, for example, prior to the issuance of the decree, the parties
vigorously disputed the appropriate size of the new apprenticeship program. In its decree,
the court ordered the admission of 400 apprentices, of whom at least 175 were to be drawn
from the minority community. 6 EPD 8716, at 5175. Thus, when he took office, the
administrator was spared the debate over dass size and simply had to deal with the practical
aspects of getting the program underway on schedule. He did so successfully.
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reluctant administrator to act, it can also serve to unduly hamper a
vigorous one. Great care must therefore be taken in the drafting of
the decree to ensure that a proper balance is established whereby
the administrator can be guided and assisted by specific provisions
while at the same time he can retain sufficient flexibility to handle
unexpected situations as they arise.
2. Form of Administration
Experience indicates that, on balance, a single administrator is
probably more effective than a committee. A large group is cum-
bersome and inevitably becomes bureaucratic. Decisions and rec-
ommendations depend upon votes, and lobbying efforts by the
various parties can be expected to be vigorous if a close vote
appears likely. There might also be difficulty in assembling a large
group for a meeting or a hearing. The impressive results attained
under the Local 638 and Wood Lathers decrees demonstrate that a
decisive individual can speedily immerse himself in the problems of
the industry, develop expertise, and then make specific recom-
mendations for the achievement of equal employment oppor-
tunities. It is clear that the troubleshooting and negotiating aspects
of the administrator's job are better handled by a single person,
and that one individual can certainly operate more swiftly and
more informally than a group.
On the other hand, a single administrator may be temporarily
inaccessible, due to other business activities, illness or even vaca-
tion, causing delays and inconveniencing the parties. He could also
die, resign, or otherwise cease functioning suddenly, leaving the
parties to fend for themselves. Such problems are unlikely to arise
when a committee is appointed.
Of course, the single administrator can take steps to prevent
such delays and inconveniences. For example, he can appoint an
assistant and have a secretary or clerk who, under his supervision,
could work steadily on the matter at hand. Unfortunately, employ-
ing such additional personnel is expensive; but the continuity
achieved would seem to be well worth the cost. The parties might
even reap a side benefit from additional personnel to the extent
that when assistants can handle the routine activities, the adminis-
trator will have more time for thought and innovation. However,
none of the functioning administrators has yet developed such a
procedure.
In addition, with a single administrator, personality plays an
important role. Different persons approach the same problem
1974]
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differently, and one can expect vast differences in philosophy,
temperament and style. Since the court expects to defer to the
administrator's judgment, the administrator becomes an extremely
important part of the proceedings. A bad or even lazy adminis-
trator would certainly impede enforcement efforts, and constant
resort to the court would be expensive and time-consuming. For
that reason, the administrator must be selected with great care. 10 3
And, if the parties are dissatisfied with the administrator's perfor-
mance, they should not hesitate to ask the court for his removal.
CONCLUSION
Historically, courts have been flexible enough to develop new
devices in order to adapt ancient institutions to suit present needs.
In the absence of legislation, they have exercised their inherent
powers to provide themselves with appropriate instruments re-
quired for the performance of their duties. Such a need has arisen
under Title VII, where dose monitoring of industry-wide em-
ployment conditions is often required for many years after a decree
has been filed. To provide detailed and expert attention to achiev-
ing equal employment opportunities, while at the same time avoid-
ing intolerable burdens on the courts themselves, the concept of an
administrator has been developed and is slowly gaining adherents.
Although the number of cases where administrators have been
employed is still small, these cases are significant. Much room
remains for experimentation and for further definition of the
administrator's powers. The results to date, however, indicate quite
dearly that this is an effective tool whose use should be greatly
expanded.
103 In the Wood Lathers and Local 638 cases, the court requested the parties to agree
upon an administrator. When they could not do so, the parties were asked to agree upon a
list of acceptable candidates. In each case this list was submitted to the court which then
selected one of the candidates proposed by the defendant union. In both cases, all
candidates were attorneys. Presumably the parties recognized that the administrator must
exercise legal skills which only a trained attorney could be expected to possess. Moreover,
the majority of the candidates submitted to the court were expert in the labor and/or civil
rights fields, and the two eventually selected were well-known labor mediators. There is no
doubt that their labor expertise facilitated the ability of the respective administrators to
rapidly grasp the situation, and to deal speedily with the matters at hand.
Where a committee is chosen, greater flexibility in choice of personnel exists and
consideration should be given to utilizing non-attorneys with specialized knowledge of areas
outside the usual range of lawyers. For example, it might be desirable to include as a
member of an advisory committee a person with experience in vocational testing. See, e.g.,
United States v. Local 638, Steam Pipefitters, 347 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
